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Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause large, immediate
increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by firms with high levels of shareownership
among top executives or the board of directors. These findings are inconsistent with existing "old view"
and "new view" theories of dividend taxation. We propose a simple alternative theory of dividend
taxation in which managers and shareholders have conflicting interests, and show that it can explain
the evidence. Using this agency model, we develop an empirically implementable formula for the
efficiency cost of dividend taxation. The key determinant of the efficiency cost is the nature of private
contracting. If the contract between shareholders and the manager is second-best efficient, deadweight
burden follows the standard Harberger formula and is second-order (small) despite the pre-existing
distortion of over-investment by the manager. If the contract is second-best inefficient -- as is likely
when firms are owned by diffuse shareholders because of incentives to free-ride when monitoring
managers -- dividend taxation generates a first-order (large) efficiency cost. An illustrative calibration
of the formula using empirical estimates from the 2003 dividend tax reform in the U.S. suggests that














The taxation of dividend income has generated substantial interest and controversy in both
academic and policy circles. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by proposing a
new theory of dividend taxation based on the agency theory of the ￿rm (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Our model builds on two leading theories of dividend taxation and corporate behavior:
the ￿old view￿(Harberger 1962, 1966, Feldstein 1970, Poterba and Summers 1985) and the
￿new view￿(Auerbach 1979, Bradford 1981, King 1977). The old view assumes that marginal
investment is ￿nanced by the external capital market through new equity issues. Under this
assumption, the taxation of dividends raises the cost of capital and, as a result, has a negative
e⁄ect on corporate investment, dividend payouts, and overall economic e¢ ciency. The new
view assumes that marginal investment is ￿nanced from the ￿rm￿ s retained earnings. In
this case, the dividend tax rate does not a⁄ect the cost of capital because the dividend tax
applies equally to current and future distributions. Therefore, the dividend tax rate does not
a⁄ect the investment and dividend payout decisions of the ￿rm, and has no e⁄ect on economic
e¢ ciency.1
There has been a longstanding debate in the empirical literature testing between the old
and new views. Feldstein (1970), Poterba and Summers (1985), Hines (1996), and Poterba
(2004) document a negative association between dividend payments and the dividend tax rate
in the time series in the U.S. and U.K., consistent with the old view. In contrast, Auerbach and
Hassett (2002) present evidence that retained earnings are the marginal source of investment
funds for most corporations in the U.S., a ￿nding that points in favor of the new view.
More recently, several papers have studied the e⁄ect of the large dividend tax cut enacted
in 2003 in the U.S. (Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown et al. (2007), Nam et al. (2005)). Chetty
and Saez documented four patterns: (1) Regular dividends rose sharply after the 2003 tax cut,
with an implied net-of-tax elasticity of dividend payments of 0.75. (2) The response was very
rapid ￿total dividend payouts rose by 20% within one year of enactment ￿and was stronger
among ￿rms with high levels of accumulated assets. (3) The response was much larger among
￿rms where top executives owned a larger fraction of outstanding shares (see also Brown et
al. (2007) and Nam et al. (2005)). (4) The response was much larger among ￿rms with large
1See Auerbach (2003) for a summary of these models and the neoclassical literature on taxes and corporate
behavior.
1shareholders on the board of directors.
It is di¢ cult to reconcile these four ￿ndings with the old view, new view, or other existing
theories of dividend taxation. The increase in dividends appears to support the old view
because dividends should not respond to permanent dividend tax changes under the new
view.2 However, the speed of the response is too large for a supply-side mechanism where
dividend payouts rise because of increased investment eventually leading to higher pro￿ts and
dividend payouts.3 The rapid dividend payout response could be explained by building in a
signaling value for dividends as in John and Williams (1985), Poterba and Summers (1985),
or Bernheim (1991). However, neither the signaling model nor the standard old and new view
models directly predict ￿ndings (3) and (4) on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the dividend
payout response by ￿rm ownership structure.4
In this paper, we propose a simple alternative model of dividend taxation that matches
the four empirical ￿ndings described above. The model is motivated by agency models
of ￿rm behavior that have been a cornerstone of the corporate ￿nance literature since the
pioneering work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook
(1984), and Jensen (1986).5 Our model nests the neoclassical old view and new view models
but incorporates agency e⁄ects: managers have a preference for retaining earnings beyond the
optimal level from the shareholders￿perspective. We model this preference as arising from
perks and pet projects, although the underlying source of the con￿ ict between managers and
shareholders does not matter for our analysis. Shareholders can provide incentives to managers
2One way of reconciling the dividend increase with the new view is if the tax cut was perceived as temporary
by ￿rms. However, Auerbach and Hassett (2005) document that the share prices of immature ￿rms that are
predicted to pay dividends in the future rose when the reform was announced, suggesting that ￿rms perceived
the tax cut as fairly permanent. In any case, the basic new view model would not explain ￿ndings (3) and (4)
even for a temporary tax cut.
3Poterba￿ s (2004) estimates using an old view model implied that the 2003 tax reform would increase dividend
payments by 20 percent in the long run, but that the adjustment process would be slow, with only a quarter of
the long-run e⁄ect taking place within three years.
4The empirical evidence is also not fully explained by Sinn￿ s (1991) ￿life cycle￿ theory, which synthesizes
the old view and new view in a model where ￿rms start as old view ￿rms and become new view ￿rms once
they have accumulated su¢ cient internal funds, at which point they start paying dividends. In that model,
the payout response should be very small among mature ￿rms with high levels of accumulated assets, but the
data exhibit the opposite pattern.
5Several empirical studies have provided support for the agency theory as an explanation of why ￿rms pay
dividends (see e.g., Christie and Nanda 1994, LaPorta et al. 2000, Fenn and Liang 2001, Desai, Foley, and
Hines 2007). Empirical studies have provided support for the predictions of the signalling theory of dividends
as well (e.g. Bernheim and Wantz 1995, Bernheim and Redding 2001). See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a
critical survey of these two literatures. It is of course possible that both signalling and agency e⁄ects are at
play empirically.
2to invest and pay out dividends through costly monitoring and through pay-for-performance
(e.g. giving managers shares of the ￿rm). Only the large shareholders of the ￿rm choose
to monitor the ￿rm in equilibrium because of the free-rider problem in monitoring. Since
managers have a higher preference for retained earnings than shareholders, they overinvest in
wasteful projects and pay too few dividends relative to the ￿rst-best.
In this agency model, a dividend tax cut leads to an immediate increase in dividend pay-
ments because it increases the relative value of dividends for the manager and increases the
amount of monitoring by large shareholders. Firms where managers place more weight on
pro￿t maximization ￿either because the manager owns a large number of shares or because
there are more large shareholders who monitor the ￿rm ￿are more likely to increase dividends
both on the extensive and intensive margins in response to a tax cut. Hence, the agency
model o⁄ers a simple explanation of the empirical ￿ndings from the 2003 tax cut and prior
reforms that is consistent with evidence that marginal investment is funded primarily out of
retained earnings.
The e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation in the agency model di⁄er substantially from the
predictions of neoclassical models. Since dividend taxation a⁄ects dividend payouts, dividend
taxes always create an e¢ ciency cost, irrespective of the marginal source of investment funds.
The magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost depends fundamentally on whether the contract between
shareholders and managers is second-best e¢ cient, i.e. if it maximizes total private surplus
(excluding tax revenue) given the costs of monitoring and incentivizing the manager. If
the contract is second best e¢ cient, the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation takes the standard
Harberger triangle form, and is small (second-order) at low tax rates. An important implication
of this result is that the pre-existing distortion of excessive investment by the manager does
not by itself lead to a ￿rst-order deadweight burden from taxation. This result contrasts with
the common view that the e¢ ciency costs of taxing markets with pre-existing distortions are
large (￿rst-order). The conventional ￿Harberger trapezoid￿intuition ￿which is based on a
market with an exogenously ￿xed pre-existing distortion ￿breaks down when the size of the
distortion is endogenously set at the second-best e¢ cient level.6
However, if the contract between shareholders and the manager is not second best e¢ cient,
6This result is related to the constrained ￿rst welfare theorem in economies with private information (Prescott
and Townsend 1984a,b). If the ￿rst welfare theorem holds given the constraints, a small tax causes a second-
order welfare loss.
3dividend taxation does create a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost. In our model, such second-best
ine¢ ciencies arise when companies are owned by di⁄use shareholders. Each shareholder does
not internalize the bene￿ts of monitoring to other shareholders (a free-riding problem), and as
a result monitoring is under-provided in equilibrium. In this situation, a corrective tax, such
as a dividend subsidy, would improve e¢ ciency. A dividend tax creates precisely the opposite
incentive for the monitors, and leads to a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost. Thus, when managers￿
interests di⁄er from shareholders and companies are owned by di⁄use shareholders ￿which
is perhaps the most plausible description of modern corporations given available evidence
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 1997) ￿dividend taxation can create substantial ine¢ ciency.
Our analysis yields a simple yet fairly robust formula for the deadweight cost of taxation
that nests the old and new view results. The formula is a function of a small set of empirically
estimable parameters such as the elasticity of dividend payments with respect to the tax rate
and the fraction of shares owned by executives and the board of directors. The formula is
una⁄ected by allowing for equity issues, costly debt ￿nance, or corruption within the board of
directors.7 We provide an illustrative calibration using estimates from the 2003 tax reform.
The calibration shows that the marginal e¢ ciency cost of raising the dividend tax from the
current rate of 15% could be of the same order of magnitude as the amount of revenue raised.
More than 80% of the e¢ ciency cost arises from the agency e⁄ect rather than the Harberger
channel emphasized in the old view model.
In addition to drawing heavily from well established models in the corporate ￿nance litera-
ture, our analysis is related to two contemporaneous theoretical studies motivated by evidence
from the 2003 dividend tax cut. Gordon and Dietz (2006) contrast the e⁄ects of dividend
taxation in new view, signalling, and agency models. While our analysis shares some aspects
with the model they develop, there are two important di⁄erences. First, since our framework
is streamlined to focus exclusively on agency issues, we are able to derive additional results on
￿rm behavior and e¢ ciency costs.8 Second, Gordon and Dietz assume that dividend payout
decisions are always made by shareholders (as opposed to management) to maximize their
total surplus. This assumption leads to very di⁄erent results in both the positive and e¢ -
7An important limitation of the formula is that it does not account for share repurchases. Like most existing
studies of dividend taxation in public ￿nance, we abstract from share repurchase decisions. See section 5 for a
discussion of how share repurchases would a⁄ect the e¢ ciency results.
8We discuss the connections between our analysis and that of Gordon and Dietz in greater detail in sections
4 and 5.
4ciency analysis. Gordon and Dietz￿ s model does not directly predict a link between executive
or board shareownership and behavioral responses to dividend taxation. In addition, taxing
dividends does not create a ￿rst-order distortion in their model, since there is no pre-existing
distortion and dividends are always set at the second-best e¢ cient level. A second recent
study is Korinek and Stiglitz (2006), who build on Sinn￿ s (1991) model to analyze the e⁄ects
of temporary changes in dividend tax rates. They incorporate ￿nancing constraints and es-
tablish new results on intertemporal tax arbitrage opportunities for ￿rms. In contrast with
our model, Korinek and Stiglitz assume that retained earnings are allocated e¢ ciently by the
manager. As a result, they obtain the new view neutrality result that permanent dividend
tax policy changes have no e⁄ects on economic e¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple two-
period model that nests the old and new views as a benchmark reference. In section 3, we
introduce agency issues into the model and characterize manager and shareholder behavior. In
section 4, we characterize behavioral responses to dividend taxation in the agency model, and
compare the model￿ s predictions with available empirical evidence. In section 5, we analyze
the e¢ ciency consequences of dividend taxation in a set of agency models that make di⁄erent
assumptions about the formation of contracts between shareholders and managers. Section
6 provides an illustrative calibration of the general formula derived for deadweight burden.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Old and New Views in a Two-Period Model
We begin by developing a two-period model that nests the old view and new view, which
serves as a point of departure for our agency analysis. Consider a ￿rm that has initial cash
holdings of X at the beginning of period 0. The ￿rm can raise additional funds by issuing
equity, which we denote by E. The ￿rm￿ s manager can do two things with the ￿rm￿ s cash
holdings: pay out dividends or invest the money in a project that yields revenue in the next
period. Let I denote the level of investment and f(I) the revenue earned in period t = 1. Let
D = X + E ￿ I denote the ￿rm￿ s dividend payment in period 0. In period 1, the ￿rm closes
and pays out f(I) as a dividend to its shareholders. Assume that the production function f
is strictly concave. A tax at rate td is levied on dividend payments in all periods. Investors
5can also purchase a government bond that pays a ￿xed interest rate of r (which is una⁄ected
by the dividend tax rate), and therefore discount pro￿ts at a rate r.9
The manager￿ s objective is to maximize the value of the ￿rm, given by
V = (1 ￿ td)D +
1 ￿ td
1 + r
f(X + E ￿ D) ￿ E (1)
There are three choice variables: equity issues, dividend payments, and investment. To char-
acterize how these variables are chosen, it is useful to distinguish between two cases: (1) A
cash-rich ￿rm, which has cash X such that f0(X) ￿ 1 + r and (2) a cash-constrained ￿rm,
which has cash X such that f0(X) > 1 + r.
Cash-Rich Firms ￿The New View. First observe that the ￿rm will never set E > 0 and
D > 0 simultaneously. If a ￿rm both issued equity and paid dividends, it could strictly increase
pro￿ts by reducing both E and D by $1 and lowering its tax bill by $td. Hence, any ￿rm that
wishes to raise additional funds will not pay dividends.




(D = 0) =
1 ￿ td
1 + r
f0(X) ￿ 1 ￿ 0
Hence, a cash rich ￿rm sets E￿ = 0 and simply splits its prior cash holding X between








Hence the optimal dividend payout rate is determined by the ￿rst order condition
f0(X ￿ D￿) = 1 + r
Intuitively, ￿rms invest to the point where the marginal product of investment f0(I) equals
the return on investment in the bond, 1+r. We denote by IS this socially e¢ cient investment
level. Note that the optimal dividend payment and investment level do not depend on the
dividend tax rate td. This is the classic ￿new view￿dividend tax neutrality result obtained by
Auerbach (1979) and others. The source of this result is transparent in the two period case:
9Throughout this paper, we abstract from general-equilibrium e⁄ects through which changes in td may a⁄ect
the equilibrium rate of return, r.
6the (1￿td) term factors out of the value function in equation (1) when E = 0. Intuitively, the
￿rm must pay the dividend tax regardless of whether it pays out money in the current period
or next period. As a result, dividend taxation has no impact on ￿rm behavior and economic
e¢ ciency when ￿rms ￿nance the marginal dollar of investment out of retained earnings.
Cash-Constrained Firms ￿The Old View: Now consider a ￿rm with X such that f0(X) >
1 + r. The marginal value of paying dividends when E = 0 for this ￿rm is
@V
@D




Hence a cash-constrained ￿rm never pays dividends in the ￿rst period: since the marginal
product of investment exceeds the interest rate, it is strictly preferable to invest all retained
earnings. This ￿rm therefore invests all the cash it has: I = X + E. Now consider the





f(X + E) ￿ E:
The optimal equity issue is given by the conditions
E￿ = 0 if (1 ￿ td)f0(X) < 1 + r (3)
(1 ￿ td)f0(X + E￿) = 1 + r if (1 ￿ td)f0(X) ￿ 1 + r (4)
These conditions show that ￿rms which ￿nance their marginal dollar of investment from new
equity issues invest to the point where the marginal net-of-tax return to investment I￿ =
X + E￿, equals the return on investment in the bond, 1 + r. Firms that have X su¢ ciently
large so that (1￿td)f0(X) < 1+r have a net-of-tax return below the interest rate for the ￿rst
dollar of equity. They therefore choose the corner solution of no equity (and no dividends,
since they have f0(X) > 1 + r) because of the tax wedge.
Implicit di⁄erentiation of equation (4) shows that @I￿=@td < 0 and @E￿=@td < 0 for ￿rms
at an interior optimum. For a su¢ ciently large tax cut, ￿rms who were at the corner solution
E￿ = 0 begin to issue equity. These are the standard ￿old view￿results that an increase in the
dividend tax rate reduces equity issues and investment. The source of these results is again
transparent in our simple two-period model: the (1￿td) term does not factor out of the value
function in equation (1) when D = 0 and E > 0. When the marginal dollar of investment
is ￿nanced from external funds, the price of a marginal dollar of investment is $1 but the
7marginal product remains (1 ￿ td)f0(I)=(1 + r). A dividend tax increase therefore lowers the
marginal product of investment but does not a⁄ect the price of investment for cash-constrained
￿rms. Hence, an increase in td lowers the optimal amount of investment. This leads to lower
dividends in the next period because revenue f(I) falls. It is important to note, however, that
dividend payments are not a⁄ected in the short-run in this simple old view model. Following
a tax cut, investment increases immediately, and dividends increase only in the long-run after
the additional investment pays o⁄.
To calculate the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation for cash constrained ￿rms, denote by
P = D + f(I)=(1 + r) total payout over the two periods. Total surplus in the economy is
W = V +tdP. The marginal deadweight burden of taxation is dW=dtd. The envelope theorem
applied to (1) implies that dV=dtd = ￿P. Intuitively, since the ￿rm has already maximized
social surplus net of tax revenue, the only ￿rst-order e⁄ect of the tax on V is the mechanical
revenue cost. This leads to the standard Harberger formula for deadweight burden:











d(1￿td) denotes the elasticity of total payout P with respect to the net-of-tax
rate 1 ￿ td.
Note that (5) characterizes deadweight burden for both cash-rich and cash-constrained
￿rms. For cash-constrained (old view) ￿rms, P = f(I)=(1 + r) falls with td and hence
"P > 0 ) dW=dtd < 0. For new view ￿rms, P does not respond to td and hence "P = 0
) dW=dtd = 0.
Summary. These results are summarized on the left side of Table 1. In the neoclassical
model of pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, the e¢ ciency consequences of dividend taxation depend
critically on the marginal source of investment funds. Since most investment in developed
economies is undertaken by ￿rms with large amounts of retained earnings (Auerbach and
Hassett 2002), the cash-rich case is perhaps most relevant in understanding the aggregate
e⁄ects of dividend tax policy. This would imply that permanent changes in dividend tax
policy have small e⁄ects on aggregate economic e¢ ciency.
A key assumption underlying this conclusion is that ￿rms￿managers choose policies solely
to maximize ￿rm value. This assumption contrasts with the modern corporate ￿nance lit-
8erature, which emphasizes the tension between executives￿and shareholders￿interests in ex-
plaining corporate behavior. In the next section, we incorporate these agency issues into the
model.
3 An Agency Model of Firm Behavior
In this and the next section, we restrict attention to a cash-rich ￿rm that has f0(X) > 1 + r.
Firms with f0(X) < 1 + r never pay dividends. Since our goal is to construct a model
consistent with available evidence on dividend payout behavior, it is the behavior of cash-rich
￿rms that is of greatest interest for the positive analysis. In the e¢ ciency analysis in section
5, we allow for cash-constrained ￿rms, thereby nesting both the old and new view models when
deriving formulas for deadweight burden. We defer modelling equity issues to section 5 since
no cash-rich ￿rm issues equity in equilibrium. To facilitate comparisons with the neoclassical
model, the results for the agency model are summarized on the right side of Table 1.
3.1 Model Setup
The basic source of agency problems in the modern corporation is a divergence between the
objectives of managers and shareholders. We model the source of the divergence as a ￿pet
project￿ that generates no pro￿ts for shareholders but yields utility to the manager. In
particular, the manager can now do three things with the ￿rm￿ s cash X: pay out dividends
D, invest I in a ￿productive￿project that yields pro￿ts f(I) for shareholders, or invest J in
a pet project that gives the manager private bene￿ts of g(J). Assume that both f and g are
strictly concave.
The function g should be interpreted as a reduced-form means of capturing divergences
between the managers￿and shareholders￿objectives. For example, the utility g(J) may arise
from allocation of funds to perks, tunnelling, a taste for empire building, or a preference for
projects that lead to a ￿quiet life￿ .10 While there is debate in corporate ￿nance about which
of these elements of g(J) is most important, the underlying structure that determines g(J)
does not matter for our analysis.
Manager￿ s Objective. The agency problem arises because shareholders cannot observe
10There is a large literature in corporate ￿nance providing evidence for such agency models. Recent examples
include Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
9real investment opportunities and hence have to let the manager decide about I, J, and D.
Shareholders push managers toward pro￿t maximization through two channels: incentive pay
and monitoring. Incentive pay is achieved through features of the manager￿ s compensation
contract such as share grants, bonuses, etc. We model such ￿nancial incentives by assuming
that the shareholders compensate the manager with a fraction ￿ of the shares of the company.
Shareholders can also tilt managers￿decisions toward pro￿t maximization by monitoring.
For example, shareholders could potentially veto some investment projects proposed by man-
agers or pressure managers to pay dividends. More generally, monitoring can force managers
to put more weight on the shareholders￿objective to avoid being ￿red. To model the e⁄ect of
such monitoring, suppose that ￿ units of monitoring makes the manager choose D;I, and J as
if he values an extra dollar of pro￿ts by an extra $￿ in addition to his direct share ownership.
That is, the manager chooses I;J; and D to maximize






g(X ￿ I ￿ D) (6)
Let ! = ￿(1￿td)+￿ denote the total weight that managers place on pro￿ts. When ! is low,
the manager has little stake in the pro￿ts of the ￿rm and is therefore tempted to retain excess
earnings and invest in the pet project.11
Shareholders￿Objectives. Next, we characterize how shareholders choose the level of mon-
itoring (￿). Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986), we assume that the costs of monitoring are
incurred by each shareholder who chooses to monitor the ￿rm, whereas the bene￿ts of better
manager behavior accrue to all shareholders. This leads to a free-rider problem in monitoring.
To model this problem, suppose that there are N shareholders, each of whom owns a fraction
￿i of the shares (so that
PN
1 ￿i = 1 ￿ ￿). Each shareholder chooses a level of monitoring
￿i ￿ 0. The total monitoring level is ￿ =
P
￿i. Suppose that shareholders incur a ￿xed
cost k if they choose to monitor the ￿rm (i.e. set ￿i > 0). This ￿xed cost could re￿ ect for
example the cost of going to stockholder meetings. In addition, suppose there is a convex and
increasing variable cost c(￿i) to do ￿i units of monitoring (the intensive margin) that satis￿es
c0(￿i = 0) = 0. Increasing ￿ is costly because reviewing managers￿plans, ￿ring misbehaving
11The pet project g(J) is presumably small relative to the ￿rm￿ s productive project f(I). However, ! is also
likely to be small in largely publicly traded corporations, where executives own a small fraction of total shares
and di⁄use shareownership can lead to a low level of monitoring. Combining a small pet project g(J) with a
small ! can make the manager deviate substantially from the shareholders￿optimal investment level.
10managers, etc. requires e⁄ort. Each shareholder chooses ￿i to maximize his net pro￿ts
Vi = (1 ￿ td)￿i ￿ [D +
1
1 + r
f(I)] ￿ k ￿ 1(￿i > 0) ￿ c(￿i) (7)
where 1(￿i > 0) is an indicator function. In the Nash equilibrium, ￿ is determined such that
each shareholder￿ s choice of ￿i is a best response to the others￿behavior. It is well known
from the public goods literature that monitoring will be below the social optimum (i.e., the
level that would be chosen if one shareholder owned the entire ￿rm) in equilibrium.12 In
addition, it is easy to see that there is a threshold level ￿ such that small shareholders with
￿i < ￿ will not monitor the ￿rm, while large shareholders with ￿i > ￿ do monitor. Since the
number of large shareholders is typically small, it is natural to assume that these individuals
cooperatively choose the level of monitoring ￿ by forming a ￿board of directors￿that is in
charge of monitoring the manager. Let ￿B denote the total fraction of shares held by the
board of directors. The board chooses ￿ to maximize its joint pro￿ts net of monitoring costs,
recognizing that none of the small shareholders will ever participate in monitoring and taking
into account the manager￿ s behavioral responses:
V B = (1 ￿ td)￿B ￿ [D(!) +
1
1 + r
f(I(!))] ￿ c(￿) (8)
Ownership Structure. Thus far, we have speci￿ed the choices and objectives of the three
key players in our agency model ￿the manager, the board of directors, and the small share-
holders. What remains to be speci￿ed is the determination of the shares of these players ￿
that is, how the ￿rm￿ s ownership structure (￿ and ￿B) is set. We draw a distinction between
the short-run positive analysis and the long-run e¢ ciency analysis in the speci￿cation of the
￿rm￿ s ownership structure.
To understand the evolution of ownership structures, we use data on top executive share
ownership from Execucomp and board of director share ownership from the Investor Respon-
sibility Research Center for publicly traded ￿rms in the U.S. See the data appendix for details
on sample de￿nition and construction of the share ownership variables. Figure 1 plots the logs
of average managerial and (non-employee) board share ownership for the years in which data
12As emphasized in the corporate ￿nance literature on free-riding problems, the Coasian solution (Coase
1960) is unlikely to emerge in this setting because of transaction costs in coordinating many small shareholders.
11are available around the 2003 tax reform. For comparison, the log of total nominal dividend
payments for ￿rms listed in CRSP is plotted on the right scale. Note that the range of both
scales is ￿xed at 0.8, facilitating direct comparisons. The ￿gure shows a clear trend break
in dividend payouts after the reform. Dividends rose by a total of 25% in the three years
following the reform, after several years of remaining stable. In contrast, both ownership
variables exhibit no trend break around the reform.
To quantify the e⁄ect of the tax reform on ￿, ￿B, and D, we estimate a set of regression
models. Since the variables plotted in Figure 1 all exhibit roughly linear time trends, we
estimate models using OLS with two explanatory variables in Table 2: a linear year trend and
a ￿post reform￿indicator which is 1 for all years including and after 2003. The change in
managerial or board shareownership following the reform is small and statistically insigni￿cant,
although the point estimates should be interpreted cautiously in view of the relatively large
standard errors. In contrast, the post-reform dummy is large and statistically signi￿cant for
total dividends. Consistent with the graphical evidence, these results suggest that the tax cut
had little e⁄ect on ownership structure in the short run.
Since the evidence on dividend payout behavior we are attempting to explain concerns the
e⁄ect of the 2003 dividend tax within a two year horizon, we take ￿ and ￿B as ￿xed in our
positive analysis. In the longer run, and particularly when new ￿rms are started, ￿ and ￿B
are presumably endogenous to the tax regime. Therefore, in the e¢ ciency analysis in section
5, we model how ￿ and ￿B are determined. Allowing for endogenous ownership structure
is particularly important in the e¢ ciency analysis because the deadweight cost of taxation
depends critically on how ￿ and ￿B are determined.
3.2 Manager Behavior
Having set up the model, we now characterize manager and board behavior in the short run,
taking ownership structure as ￿xed. The manager￿ s behavior is determined by his weight on









g(X ￿ I ￿ D): (9)
12Assume that g0(0) > !f0(X), which guarantees an interior optimum in investment behavior.
Then I and D are determined by the following ￿rst-order conditions:
!f0(I) = g0(X ￿ I ￿ D) (10)
! ￿
g0(X ￿ I ￿ D)
1 + r
with strict equality i⁄ D > 0 (11)
Let D(!) and I(!) denote the dividend and investment choices of the manager as a function





Lemma 1 D(!) and I(!) follow threshold rules:
￿ If ! ￿ ! then D(!) = 0 and I(!) is chosen such that !f0(I) = g0(X ￿ I).
￿ If ! > ! then I(!) = IS and D(!) > 0 is chosen such that ! = g0(X ￿ IS ￿ D)=(1 + r).
Proof. Consider ! ￿ !. Suppose the ￿rm sets D > 0. Then the ￿rst order conditions (11)





It follows that ! >
g0(X￿IS)
1+r = !, contradicting the supposition. Hence ! ￿ ! ) D(!) = 0.
Now consider ! > !. Suppose the ￿rm sets D = 0. Then the ￿rst order conditions (10)





follows that ! ￿ !, contradicting the supposition. Hence ! > ! ) D(!) > 0, and (11) yields
the desired expression for D(!). QED.
Figure 2 illustrates the threshold rules that the manager follows by plotting D(!), I(!),
and J(!) with quadratic production functions. When ! is below the threshold value !, the
marginal value of the ￿rst dollar of dividends is negative in the manager￿ s objective function.
The optimal level of dividends is therefore zero, the corner solution. Intuitively, if managers
have a su¢ ciently weak interest in pro￿t maximization, they wish to retain as much money as
possible for pet projects, and do not choose to pay out dividends. For ! above this threshold
value, the managers choose a level of dividends that balances the marginal bene￿t of further
investment in their pet project (g0(X ￿ IS ￿ D)=(1 + r)) with the marginal bene￿t of paying
out money and generating dividend income (!). Above !, increases in the weight on pro￿ts




> 0 for ! > ! (12)
Now consider the manager￿ s investment choice. When ! ￿ !, the manager pays no
dividends, and splits retained earnings between investment in the pro￿t-generating project
and the pet project. He chooses I to equate his private marginal returns of investing in the
two projects, as in equation (10). An increase in ! increases productive investment I and
reduces pet investment J:
I0(!) = ￿
f0(I(!))
!f00(I(!)) + g00(X ￿ I(!))
> 0 for ! < ! (13)
Once ! > !, the manager has enough cash to pay a dividend to shareholders. Since the
marginal dollar of dividends could have been used for investment, he sets the investment level
such that the marginal bene￿t of paying an extra dollar of dividends (!) equals the marginal
bene￿t of investing another dollar in the pro￿t-generating project (!f0(I)=(1+r)). Hence the
manager sets I such that f0(I)=(1 + r) = 1, implying I is ￿xed at IS for ! > !. Intuitively,
the manager would only pay a dividend if his private return to further investment in the
pro￿table project was below the interest rate. Since the tradeo⁄ between dividends and
pro￿table investment is the same for managers and shareholders, the manager only begins to
pay a dividend once he has reached the optimal level of investment from the shareholder￿ s
perspective, IS.
3.3 Board Behavior
In the short run, the board￿ s only decision is to choose the level of monitoring. The board
takes ￿B as ￿xed and chooses ￿ to maximize
V B = (1 ￿ td)￿B ￿ P(!) ￿ c(￿) (14)
where P(!) = D(!) + f(I(!))=(1 + r) denote the ￿rm￿ s total payout as a function of !.
Because both D and P are (weakly) increasing in !, P(!) is also increasing in !. The ￿rst
order condition with respect to ￿ is:
c0(￿) = (1 ￿ td)￿B ￿ P0(!). (15)
14Intuitively, the board chooses ￿ such that the marginal increase in the board￿ s share of pro￿ts
by raising ! is o⁄set by the marginal cost of monitoring. The second-order condition for an
interior maximum is:
(1 ￿ td)￿B ￿ P00(!) ￿ c00(￿) < 0: (16)
Since c0(￿ = 0) = 0 by assumption, the optimal ￿ is always in the interior, and hence (16) must
be satis￿ed at the optimal level of monitoring ￿(td).13 This second-order condition turns out
to be useful for the comparative statics analysis below.
4 Positive Analysis: E⁄ects of Dividend Taxation
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ects of changes in dividend taxation on dividend payouts and









We have already characterized dx















￿B[P0(!) + ￿(1 ￿ td)P00]
c00 ￿ P00 ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ td)
: (18)




￿BP0(!) + ￿ ￿ c00
c00 ￿ P00 ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ td)
< 0: (19)
The board￿ s second-order condition for ￿ in (16) implies that the denominator of this expression
is positive. The numerator is positive because P is increasing in ! and c is convex. Equation
(19) therefore shows that a reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increase in the
weight ! that managers put on pro￿ts. There are two channels through which this increase
in ! occurs. First, a decrease in td mechanically increases the net stake (1 ￿ td)￿ that the
13The second order condition could hold with equality, a knife-edge case that we rule out by assumption.
15manager has in the ￿rm, e⁄ectively by reducing the government￿ s stake (td) in the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts. Second, a decrease in td generally increases the level of monitoring ￿ by the board.14
Intuitively, monitoring rises because the return to monitoring is increased ￿since the external
shareholders￿net stake (1 ￿ td)￿B also rises when td falls ￿while the cost of monitoring is
unchanged.
Given that d!
dtd < 0, it is straightforward to characterize the short-run e⁄ect of dividend
taxation on ￿rm behavior. Since the manager follows a threshold rule in !, changes in td lead
to both intensive and extensive margin responses. We therefore analyze the e⁄ects of a discrete
dividend tax cut from td = t1 to td = t2 < t1 on a ￿rm￿ s behavior. Let ￿x = x(t2) ￿ x(t1)
denote the change in a variable x caused by the tax cut, and note that ￿! > 0 from (19).
Proposition 1 A dividend tax cut has the following e⁄ects on behavior for a cash-rich ￿rm:
(i) If !(t2) ￿ !: ￿D = 0, ￿I > 0, ￿J < 0; and ￿I + ￿J = 0.
(ii) If !(t1) < ! < !(t2): ￿D > 0, ￿I > 0; ￿J < 0; and ￿I + ￿J < 0.
(iii) If ! ￿ !(t1): ￿D > 0, ￿I = 0; and ￿J < 0.
Proof.
(i) When !(t2) ￿ !, D(t2) = 0 by Lemma 1. Since !(t2) > !(t1), D(t1) = 0 also.
Therefore ￿D = 0. Since I + J + D = X, and X is ￿xed, it follows that ￿I + ￿J = 0.




dtd < 0 when ! ￿ !. Hence, ￿I > 0 and
￿J = ￿￿I < 0.
(ii) When !(t1) < ! < !(t2), Lemma 1 implies D(t1) = 0 while D(t2) > 0. Hence
￿D > 0. Since ￿D > 0, ￿I+￿J = ￿￿D < 0. By Lemma 1, I(t2) = IS while I(t1) satis￿es
!(t1)f0(I(t1)) = g0(X ￿ I(t1)). Since !(t1) <
g0(X￿I(t1))
1+r by (11), it follows that f0(I(t1)) >
1 + r = f0(IS), which implies I(t1) < I(t2). Hence ￿I > 0 and ￿J = ￿￿D ￿ ￿I < 0.





dtd < 0 when ! > !. Hence t2 < t1 ) ￿D > 0. Finally, ￿J = ￿￿D < 0.
QED.
Proposition 1 shows that the tax cut (weakly) increases dividend payments for all cash-rich
￿rms because it raises the weight !(td) that managers place on pro￿ts. The e⁄ect di⁄ers across
14Technically, it is possible to have
d￿
dtd > 0 if the third derivatives g
000(J), f
000(I), c
000(￿) are su¢ ciently large
in magnitude. When f, g, and c are quadratic,
d￿
dtd is unambiguously negative. Hence, barring sharp changes
in the local curvature of the production functions, monitoring falls with the dividend tax rate.
16three regions of !. For managers who place a very low weight on pro￿ts (!(t2) < !), paying
any dividends is suboptimal after the tax cut, and hence before the tax cut as well. Hence,
￿D = 0 for such ￿rms. The second region consists of ￿rms who were non-payers prior to
the tax cut (!(t1) < !), but cross the threshold for paying when the tax rate is lowered to t2.
These ￿rms initiate dividend payments after the tax cut. Finally, the third region consists
of ￿rms who had ! high enough that they were already paying dividends prior to the tax
cut. The tax cut leads these ￿rms to place greater weight on net-of-tax pro￿ts relative to the
pet project, and therefore causes increases in the level of dividend payments on the intensive
margin. Note that these changes in dividend payout policies occur in period 0 itself. This is
consistent with the evidence that many ￿rms announced dividend increases in the weeks after
the 2003 tax reform was enacted (Chetty and Saez, 2005).
Now consider the e⁄ect of the tax cut on investment behavior. The tax cut increases the
net-of-tax return to the pro￿t-generating project while leaving the return to pet investment
una⁄ected. As a result, the manager substitutes from investing in perks to the pro￿t-generating
project, and I (weakly) increases while J falls. In the ￿rst region, where !(t2) < !, total
investment (I + J) is unchanged, since ￿D = 0 and total cash holdings are ￿xed. In the
second region, where the ￿rm initiates a dividend payment, investment in I rises to the socially
e¢ cient level IS, while investment in J is reduced to ￿nance the dividend payment and the
increase in I. In this region, total investment falls when the tax rate is cut. Finally, when
! > !(t1), the manager maintains I at IS and reduces investment in J to increase the dividend
payment.
An interesting implication of these results is that a dividend tax cut weakly lowers total
investment I + J for cash-rich ￿rms with an agency problem. Total investment, I + J, is the
measure that is typically observed empirically since it is di¢ cult to distinguish the components
of investment in existing datasets. This prediction contrasts with the old view model, where
a tax cut raises investment and with the new view model, where a tax cut has no e⁄ect on
investment. Intuitively, a tax cut reduces the incentive for cash-rich ￿rms to (ine¢ ciently)
over-invest in the pet project. It is important to note that the same result does not apply
to cash-constrained ￿rms in the agency model: A tax cut raises equity issues and productive
(as well as unproductive) investment by such ￿rms. Hence, a dividend tax cut leads to
an (e¢ ciency increasing) reallocation of capital and investment across ￿rms, but its e⁄ect
17on aggregate investment is ambiguous. This result is potentially consistent with the large
empirical literature on investment and the user cost of capital, which has failed to identify a
robust relationship between tax rates and aggregate investment (see e.g., Chirinko 1993, Desai
and Goolsbee, 2004).
Next, we examine how the e⁄ect of the tax cut on dividend payments varies across ￿rms
with di⁄erent ownership structures. It is again useful to distinguish between extensive and
intensive margin responses.
Proposition 2 Heterogeneity of Dividend Response to Tax Cut by Ownership Structure:
(i) Extensive Margin: Likelihood of Initiation. If !(t1) < !, initiation likelihood increases with
￿ and ￿B:
￿ If ￿D > 0 for ￿ then ￿D > 0 for ￿0 > ￿
￿ If ￿D > 0 for ￿B then ￿D > 0 for ￿0
B > ￿B
(ii) Extensive Margin: Size of Initiation. If !(t1) < ! < !(t2): @￿D
@￿ > 0, @￿D
@￿B > 0.
(iii) Intensive Margin. If ! ￿ !(t1) and g and c are quadratic: @￿D
@￿ > 0, @￿D
@￿B > 0.
Proof.
(i) The result follows directly from the e⁄ect of ￿ and ￿B on !. Observe that
@!
@￿





c00 ￿ P00 ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ td)
> 0.








c00 ￿ P00 ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ td)
> 0
Note that ￿D > 0 at a given ￿ ) D(!(t2;￿)) > 0. Since @!
@￿ > 0, we know that !(t2;￿0) >
!(t2;￿). From (12), we have @D
@! > 0, which in turn implies D(!(t2;￿0)) > D(!(t2;￿)) > 0 )
￿D > 0 for ￿0. Exploiting the result that @!
@￿B > 0 yields the analogous result for ￿B.







@x for x 2 f￿;￿Bg. We know that @D
@! > 0 from (12). Since @!
@￿ > 0 and
@!
@￿B > 0 from (i), it follows that
@D(t2)
@￿ > 0 and
@D(t2)
@￿B > 0, which proves the claim.
(iii) When ! < !(t1), the dividend level is positive both at the initial and new tax rate













￿ ￿ c00 + ￿BP0(!)
c00 ￿ P00 ￿ ￿B(1 ￿ td)
(20)
18When ! < !, P(!) = D(!) +
f(IS)
1+r . Since g00(J(!)) is constant when g is quadratic and











Recognizing that c00 and g00 are constant and that g00 < 0, it follows that @D
@td is constant in td
and decreasing in ￿ and ￿B. Therefore, @2D
@td@￿ < 0 and @2D
@td@￿B < 0. Finally, ￿D = (t2￿t1)@D
@td
with t2 ￿ t1 < 0, and therefore @￿D
@￿ > 0 and @￿D
@￿B > 0. QED.
Figure 3a plots D against ￿ in two tax regimes, with t1 = 40% and t2 = 20%. The
￿gure illustrates the three results in Proposition 2. First, among the set of ￿rms who were
non-payers prior to the tax cut, those with large executive shareholding (high ￿) are more
likely to initiate dividend payments after the tax cut. This is because managers with higher
￿ are closer to the threshold (!) of paying dividends to begin with, and are therefore more
likely to cross that threshold. Second, conditional on initiating, ￿rms with higher ￿ initiate
larger dividends. Since D(t2), the optimal dividend conditional on paying, is rising in ￿, the
size of the dividend increase, ￿D = D(t2), is larger for ￿rms with higher values of ￿ in this
region. Third, among the ￿rms who were already paying dividends prior to the tax cut, the
intensive-margin increase in the level of dividends is generally larger for ￿rms with higher ￿.15
Intuitively, the manager￿ s incentives are more sensitive to the tax rate when he owns a larger
fraction of the ￿rm. Since a change in td has a greater e⁄ect on ! when ￿ is large, the change
in dividends is larger.
These three results apply analogously to the board￿ s shareholding (￿B), as shown in Figure
3b. Non-paying ￿rms with large ￿B are closer to the threshold !, and are thus more likely to
initiate dividend payments following a tax cut. In addition, the board￿ s incentives to monitor
the ￿rm are more sensitive to the tax rate when it owns a larger stake in the ￿rm. A change
in td has a greater e⁄ect on ￿ when ￿B is large, leading to a larger dividend response.
All of these predictions regarding the impact of ownership structure on dividend payout
responses are consistent with evidence from the 2003 tax cut. This is because in our agency
model, managers choose the level of dividends and the board (rather than shareholders at
large) sets monitoring. In contrast, Gordon and Dietz￿ s (2006) agency model assumes that
15As above, this result holds as long as there are no sharp changes in the local curvature of the production
functions. If g
000(J) and c
000(￿) are su¢ ciently large in magnitude, it is possible to have
@2D
@td@￿B > 0.
19dividends are picked by the board, who represent the interest of all shareholders. Hence, their
model does not directly explain the empirical ￿nding that ￿rms with large manager or board
ownership were more likely to increase dividends following the tax cut. Their model does,
however, generate the empirically validated prediction that dividends change slowly over time.
In this sense, our model and Gordon and Dietz￿ s analysis should be viewed as complementary
e⁄orts to explain di⁄erent aspects of dividend policies.
Auxiliary Predictions. Our model predicts that ￿rms with more assets and cash holdings
(higher X) are more likely to initiate dividend payments following a tax cut.16 In contrast,
neoclassical models that nest the old and new views (e.g. Sinn 1991) predicts that ￿rms
with higher assets will respond less to a tax cut because they are more likely to ￿nance
marginal investment out of retained earnings. Chetty and Saez (2005) document that ￿rms
with higher assets or cash holdings were more likely to initiate dividends after the 2003 tax
reform, consistent with the agency model.
The importance of the interests of ￿key players￿(executives and large external sharehold-
ers) is underscored by Chetty and Saez￿ s ￿nding that ￿rms with large non-taxable shareholders
(such as pension funds) were much less likely to change dividend payout behavior in response
to the 2003 tax reform. Although we have not allowed for heterogeneity in tax rates across
shareholders in our stylized model, it is easy to see that the introduction of non-taxable share-
holders would generate this prediction. If the board includes non-taxable large shareholders,
a given change in td has a smaller impact on the board￿ s incentive to increase monitoring. As
a result, the tax cut causes a smaller increase in ￿ and generates smaller ￿D.17
5 E¢ ciency Cost of Dividend Taxation
In this section, we develop formulas for the deadweight burden of dividend taxation in the
agency model. The e¢ ciency consequences of taxation depend on how the ￿rm￿ s ownership
structure (￿ and ￿B) are determined. When both ￿ and ￿B are endogenous, it is convenient
16Firms with higher X are closer to the threshold of paying dividends, for two reasons: (1) ! is falling in X
and (2) ￿ is rising in X. A tax cut is therefore more likely to make ￿rms with higher X cross the threshold
and initiate dividend payments.
17By assuming that all shareholders are taxed equally at rate td, our model also ignores tax clientele e⁄ects.
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) propose a theory of tax clienteles in which ￿rms strategically pay dividends
to attract large shareholders as monitors. It would be interesting to explore the e⁄ects of dividend tax changes
in such a model in future work.
20to write the formulas in terms of ￿B = ￿B
1￿￿ ￿the fraction of external shares held by the board ￿
rather than ￿B. For expositional simplicity, we consider three models of increasing generality.
First, we consider the case where ￿B is ￿xed at 1, i.e. the ￿rm is owned by a single external
shareholder (￿B = 1) who chooses the manager￿ s share ￿. We then consider the case where
￿B is ￿xed at a value less than one. Finally, we analyze a model where ￿B is endogenously
determined and ￿rms can issue new equity. We present a general formula for excess burden
that nests the three cases in the third subsection. In the appendix, we show that two further
extensions ￿corruption of the board and debt ￿nance ￿yield very similar formulas.
5.1 Single External Shareholder [￿B = 1]
Determination of ￿. We model the determination of managerial share ownership using the
standard principal-agent framework in the corporate ￿nance literature. The shareholder
chooses the manager￿ s stake ￿ to maximize ￿rm value, taking into account the manager￿ s
aversion to risk and his participation constraint. To model risk aversion, it is necessary to
introduce uncertainty into the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄. Suppose that the pro￿t-generating project now
has a payo⁄f(I) only with probability ￿; with probability 1￿￿ it returns 0. The manager also
receives a salary payment S independent from the pro￿t outcome. The salary S is expensed to
the ￿rm, i.e. deducted from pro￿ts before dividend payments and dividend taxes are paid. We
introduce this salary payment so that the shareholder can meet the manager￿ s participation
constraint as described below.
Let u(c) denote the manager￿ s consumption utility, which we assume is strictly concave. In
addition to this consumption utility, the manager continues to get utility from the pet project
g. With this notation, the manager￿ s expected utility is given by
Eu(D;I) = ￿u
￿
￿(1 ￿ td)[D +
1
1 + r
f(I) ￿ S] + S
￿




g(X ￿ I ￿ D ￿ S)
Let ￿ = ￿(1￿td) denote the manager￿ s net of tax share of pro￿ts. As above, we assume that
the manager￿ s total weight on pro￿ts is augmented by shareholder monitoring (￿), so that the
21manager￿ s objective is to maximize
￿u
￿
(￿ + ￿)[D +
1
1 + r
f(I) ￿ S] + S
￿




The manager￿ s maximization program generates a mapping from ￿;￿, and S to a choice of
investment and dividends, which we denote by the functions I(￿;￿;S) and D(￿;￿;S). Note
that td a⁄ects the manager￿ s choices only indirectly through its e⁄ects on ￿;￿, and S.
The shareholder, who has linear utility, chooses ￿, ￿, and S to maximize his net payo⁄
WS = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)[D(￿;￿;S) +
1
1 + r
￿f(I(￿;￿;S)) ￿ S] ￿ c(￿) (21)
subject to the participation constraint of the manager
Eu(D;I) = 0.
The participation constraint pins down the value of S given a choice of ￿ and ￿, so we can
write S = S(￿;￿). Let total expected pro￿ts be denoted by
P(￿;￿) = D(￿;￿;S(￿;￿)) + ￿f[I(￿;￿;(￿;￿))]=(1 + r) ￿ S(￿;￿):
With this notation, the shareholder￿ s problem reduces to choosing ￿ and ￿ to maximize:
WS = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿) ￿ c(￿) (22)
If the manager￿ s utility were linear, the shareholder would achieve his objective by setting
￿ = 1 and S su¢ ciently negative (￿selling the ￿rm to the manager￿ ), so that incentives of
the principal and agent are perfectly aligned. When the manager is risk averse, however, in-
creasing pay-for-performance (￿) while keeping expected the manager￿ s utility constant forces
the principal to raise total expected compensation. Since raising compensation reduces net
pro￿ts, the optimal ￿ is less than 1 when the manager is risk averse.
E¢ ciency Analysis. Since the manager￿ s surplus is pinned at zero by his participation
constraint, total surplus in the economy (W) is the sum of the shareholder￿ s welfare and
government revenue:
W = tdP + WS
22To calculate the e¢ ciency cost of taxation, observe that dWS=dtd = ￿P because ￿ and ￿ have
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dtd














is the elasticity of total dividend payouts with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This expression
shows that the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation is positive even for cash-rich ￿rms in the
presence of agency problems. The formula for deadweight burden coincides exactly with the
Harberger formula obtained from the old view model. Deadweight burden is a second-order
function of the tax rate. That is, the marginal deadweight cost of taxation is small at low tax
rates.
First-Order vs. Second-Order E¢ ciency Costs. In view of the positive result that dividend
taxation reduces dividend payouts, it is not surprising that dividend taxation has an e¢ ciency
cost in the agency model. The reduction in dividend payments reduces government revenue
from dividends (a ￿scal externality), and leads to an e¢ ciency cost through the standard
Harberger channel.
The more surprising aspect of equation (23) is the magnitude of the deadweight burden. A
basic intuition in the theory of taxation is that taxing a market with a pre-existing distortion
leads to a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost (see e.g. Auerbach 1985, Hines 1999, Auerbach and Hines,
2003, Goulder and Williams 2003, Kaplow 2008). That is, introducing a small tax in a
previously untaxed market leads to a large deadweight burden if the market for that good is
already distorted. Equation (23) appears to violate this principle, since it predicts a second-
order deadweight burden from dividend taxation despite the pre-existing distortion in the
agency model. In particular, the manager under-provides dividends relative to the ￿rst-best
social optimum, and taxing dividends further reduces dividend payments.
Why does our result di⁄er from that of other studies in the tax literature? The pre-
existing distortions analyzed in the studies cited above are exogenously ￿xed. In contrast,
the pre-existing distortion in our model is endogenously determined through optimization of
the manager￿ s contract to maximize total private surplus given the informational constraints.
23This endogenous determination of the distortion makes the deadweight cost of taxation second-
order.
To understand the connection between deadweight burden and endogenous distortions, it
is useful to analyze the problem at a more abstract level. Consider an economy in which the
private sector has a vector x of choices. Total private surplus in the economy WS(x;td) is a
function of the private choices x and the government tax rate td. For example, in the model we
have just studied x = (￿;￿) and WS(x;td) = (1￿td￿￿)P(￿;￿)￿c(￿). It is important to note
that the choice vector x can be parametrized in alternative but equivalent ways. We could
have de￿ned x = (￿;￿) and written WS(x;td) = (1 ￿ td)(1 ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿(1 ￿ td)) ￿ c(￿). The
following lemma provides su¢ cient conditions for deadweight burden to have the Harberger
form in such an economy.18
Lemma 2 A tax has a second-order e¢ ciency cost if both of the following conditions are
satis￿ed.
(i) [No intrinsic government advantage] There exists a parametrization of the choice vector x
such that @WS
@td jx = ￿P for all x and td.
(ii) [Second-best e¢ ciency] Private agents choose x to maximize WS(x;td).
Proof. Total social surplus is W = tdP(td) + WS(x(td);td). Hence
dW
dtd










Condition (ii) implies that DxWS = 0 and hence the third term in(24) is zero. Condition (i)
implies that the fourth term is ￿P. Therefore, (24) simpli￿es to dW=dtd = tddP=dtd. This is
the standard Harberger formula, implying that a small tax has a second-order e¢ ciency cost.
QED.
The ￿rst condition in Lemma 2 requires that the government and private market have
the same tools to resolve informational constraints. Aside from the mechanical reduction
in private welfare due to the tax increase, the e⁄ect of any change in td on WS must be
replicable by changes in private market contracts. The formal statement @WS
@td jx = ￿P cap-
tures this intuition by requiring that with an appropriate speci￿cation of the private sector￿ s
18Abstractly, this lemma can be viewed as a consequence of the constrained ￿rst welfare theorem in economies
with private information (Prescott and Townsend 1984a, b).
24tools, the government can do nothing to a⁄ect private welfare beyond mechanically extracting
revenue.19 The second condition is that the private market choices maximize total private
surplus. Lemma 2 shows that as long as these two conditions hold, deadweight burden is
second-order even in the presence of pre-existing distortions. Intuitively, since td and x a⁄ect
WS in the same way (net of revenue e⁄ects) and x has already been optimized, any change in
td has only a second-order e⁄ect on social welfare.
In our model, condition (i) is satis￿ed with the parametrization x = (￿;￿). With this
parametrization, it follows immediately that the tax td has no e⁄ect on the contracting possi-
bilities between the shareholder and the manager, because the manager￿ s decision rule can be
expressed purely as a function of ￿ and ￿ (and not td). In particular, shareholders can fully
replicate the e⁄ect of td on the manager￿ s behavior by varying ￿. Since the single shareholder
chooses ￿ to maximize total private welfare (condition ii), the only ￿rst-order e⁄ect of td on
WS is the mechanical e⁄ect of paying more taxes (￿P). This ￿rst-order e⁄ect is exactly o⁄set
by the mechanical increase in tax revenue (P) in W = tdP + WS. This leaves only the term
arising from the behavioral response of P to td, which reduces government revenue. This term
is proportional to td, explaining why deadweight burden is second-order.
In contrast with our model, models with exogenous pre-existing distortions e⁄ectively
assume that the private sector has no tool to a⁄ect the size of the distortion, violating condition
(i). In that setting, the government has a technological advantage relative to the private
sector, and can induce ￿rst-order changes in e¢ ciency through taxes and subsidies. The same
applies in our analysis: if ￿ were exogenously ￿xed at some level ￿0 not chosen to maximize
the shareholder￿ s welfare, the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation has an added (1 ￿ ￿0) @P
@td
term and is therefore ￿rst-order. Intuitively, when ￿ is ￿xed, the government can change
the manager￿ s weight on pro￿t maximization ! = ￿(1 ￿ td) + ￿ costlessly through changes
in td, whereas the private sector must rely on the costly ￿ mechanism. This advantage for
the government leads to a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency gain from a dividend subsidy, and hence a ￿rst
order e¢ ciency cost from dividend taxation.
The general lesson ￿which is of relevance beyond dividend taxation ￿is that identifying
a pre-existing distortion is not su¢ cient to infer that government taxes or subsidies will have
19When the private sector consists of a single maximizing agent (e.g. as in the old view model), there are no
contracting issues, and this condition is trivially satis￿ed.
25￿rst-order e⁄ects on welfare, contrary to conventional wisdom. It is critical to understand the
private sector￿ s ability to a⁄ect the size of the distortion ￿speci￿cally whether the private sector
has the same tools as the government and whether the private sector reaches the second-best
e¢ cient outcome.
In the context of dividend taxation, there is no obvious reason that government taxation
or subsidies are a superior method of resolving agency problems in ￿rms.20 Hence, all the
models we will consider satisfy the ￿rst condition in Lemma 2. However, the second condition
is likely to break down in an economy with di⁄use shareholders. In the next subsection, we
show that dividend taxation has a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost in such an environment.
5.2 Di⁄use Shareholders [￿B < 1]
Now consider the case where the fraction of shares owned by the board (￿B) is ￿xed at a
level less than 1, so that there are some small shareholders who do not monitor the ￿rm
in equilibrium. The manager￿ s objective remains the same as above for given values of
￿ = ￿(1 ￿ td) and ￿. The board chooses ￿ and ￿ to maximize its own welfare:
WB = ￿B(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿) ￿ c(￿) (25)
This objective di⁄ers from the objective used to choose ￿ and ￿ in the single shareholder case
in only one respect: the board places a weight ￿B < 1 on net pro￿ts since it owns only part
of the outstanding shares. The small ￿minority￿shareholders are passive, and their welfare
depends on the board and manager￿ s choices:
WM = (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿)
Since the manager￿ s surplus is zero as above, total surplus W in the economy is:
W = tdP + WB + WM
It is easy to see that dWB=dtd = ￿￿BP because of the envelope conditions for ￿ and ￿ from
board maximization. Furthermore, note ￿ maximizes (1￿td￿￿)P(￿;￿) since c does not vary
20Of course, other government regulations and laws can a⁄ect the contracting technology in a way that the
private sector itself cannot achieve (see e.g, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For example, if shareholders rights
are protected in courts, shareholders may have more control over managers, reducing c(￿) and leading to a
￿rst-order e¢ ciency gain. The important point is that, keeping constant the regulatory structure embodied by
the function c(￿), dividend taxes do not a⁄ect contracting technology directly.
26with ￿. Hence, the e⁄ect of the tax increase on the minority shareholders￿utility is:
dWM
dtd






Since P is fully determined by ￿ and ￿, the last term in this expression is equivalent to the











Equation (26) shows that when shareholders are di⁄use, the deadweight cost of raising the
dividend tax is the sum of the second-order term obtained with a single owner and a new
￿rst-order term proportional to the fraction of small shareholders (1 ￿ ￿B).
The deadweight burden is ￿rst-order when ￿B < 1 because the board chooses ￿ to maxi-
mize WB rather than total shareholder surplus (WB + WM), ignoring the spillover bene￿ts of
monitoring to the minority shareholders. Since the minority shareholders prefer to free-ride,
the equilibrium level of monitoring is suboptimal even relative to the second-best e¢ cient level
where total shareholder surplus is maximized net of monitoring costs. This violates condition
(ii) in Lemma 2, and e⁄ectively creates a public good provision problem where a Pigouvian
subsidy to increase supply of the public good (monitoring) would generate a ￿rst-order im-
provement in welfare (see e.g. Kaplow 2006).21 A dividend tax moves precisely in the opposite
direction by reducing the incentive to monitor, leading to a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost.
In the ￿rst-order term in (26), the derivative of P with respect to td is taken keeping ￿
constant. This is because the level of ￿ chosen by the board is optimal from the minority
shareholders￿perspective as well: the level of ￿ that maximizes ￿B(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿) also
maximizes (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿). Intuitively, the board is able to share the cost of
increasing the manager￿ s shareownership with the minority shareholders because increasing ￿
dilutes the shareholding of both small and large shareholders proportionally. In contrast, the
board cannot share the cost c(￿) with the minority shareholders, and therefore sets ￿ at a
suboptimally low level. Thus, only the e⁄ect of td on P through ￿ leads to an externality
e⁄ect.
21Condition (i) still holds for the parametrization x = (￿;￿) as WS = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿) ￿ c(￿).
27Equation (26) con￿rms the critical role of second-best ine¢ ciency of contracts in generating
a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost of taxation. It also explains why formula for deadweight burden
di⁄ers from that obtained in Gordon and Dietz￿ s (2006) agency model. Gordon and Dietz
assume that the board of directors optimizes on behalf of all shareholders, i.e. chooses ￿ as
if ￿B = 1. Therefore, there is no free-riding problem in monitoring. The e¢ ciency cost of
dividend taxation takes the second-order Harberger form since both conditions in Lemma 2
are satis￿ed in their model.
An Alternative Representation. In order to implement (26) empirically, one would need to
estimate dP=dtdj￿, which could be di¢ cult given available data. However, it is straightforward













The ￿rst order condition with respect to ￿ in the board￿ s objective implies that (1 ￿ td ￿






+ (1 + "￿;1￿td)
￿P
(1 ￿ td)(1 ￿ ￿)
(27)
where "￿;1￿td = [(1￿td)=￿]d￿=d(1￿td) is the elasticity of manager shareownership w.r.t. the
net-of-tax rate. Plugging (27) into (26), we obtain
dW
dtd




+ (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 + "￿;1￿td): (28)
Equation (28) is easier to implement empirically than (26) because one could in principle
estimate the total elasticity "P;1￿td and "￿;1￿td by estimating the e⁄ect of dividend tax changes
on dividend payouts and managerial share ownership. Intuitively, dP=dtdj￿ can be inferred
by estimating "￿;1￿td and subtracting out the e⁄ect of the change in ￿ from "P;1￿td. We
summarize the e¢ ciency consequences of the agency model in the right-hand-side of Table 1.
5.3 Endogenous ￿B and Equity Issues
To complete our analysis, we consider a model in which the ownership structure of the ￿rm is
fully endogenous, i.e. both ￿B and ￿ are determined endogenously. When ￿B is endogenous,
28it is relatively straightforward to allow the ￿rm to issue new equity (E). To make equity issues
potentially desirable, we drop the assumption that f0(X) > 1+r, leaving X unrestricted. The
model we analyze in this section therefore nests both the old and new view models, and the
formula for deadweight burden applies to both types of ￿rms. We begin by modelling the
determination of E and ￿B, and then turn to the e¢ ciency analysis. The main result is that
allowing for endogenous ￿B and E does not a⁄ect the formula for deadweight burden in (26).
Model of E and ￿B. We break the manager and shareholder￿ s choices into two stages. In
the second stage, the manager chooses D and I conditional on his contract, as in the two cases
analyzed above. In the ￿rst stage, the external shareholders choose E, and an acquirer buys
a fraction ￿B of the outstanding shares to take control of the board and set the manager￿ s
contract (￿;￿). We model the ￿rst stage using a Nash equilibrium as follows. First, the
dispersed shareholders issue equity E to maximize the value of the ￿rm, taking as given the
choices of the board and manager since each small shareholder￿ s equity issue decision has little
impact on the ￿rm￿ s overall cash holdings (X + E). The acquirer then makes a tender o⁄er
to acquire control by buying a fraction ￿B of the company and making a contract (￿;￿) with
the manager. The acquirer picks (￿B;￿;￿) in order to maximize his surplus, taking the equity
issue choice E of dispersed shareholders as given.
We begin by characterizing the manager￿ s behavior in the second stage and work backwards.








taking all other variables as ￿xed. This leads to a function P(￿;￿;E) = D+￿f(I)=(1+r)￿S
that gives the total expected payout in terms of the manager￿ s contract and equity raised.
To model how ￿B is determined in the ￿rst stage, suppose that the company is initially
owned by a group of dispersed shareholders. A wealthy shareholder enters the market and
buys shares of the company to acquire control of the board through tender o⁄ers. This
acquiring shareholder starts with no holdings of the company (￿0
B = 0). The acquirer buys
the shares in bulk at a price equal to the value of the shares after the acquisition (consistent
with current practice in tender o⁄ers), anticipating the ￿nal equilibrium value of the ￿rm.22
22This model of the formation and value of large block shareholders follows the corporate ￿nance literature,
starting with the seminal contribution of Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
29Absent any additional bene￿t from controlling a company, no individual would want to
acquire the ￿rm because he must incur the monitoring costs c(￿) when he has control of the
board. To explain the presence of large shareholders, we introduce a non-market value of
controlling a fraction ￿B of the company K(￿B). The function K captures bene￿ts to board
members such as perks or utility of control.23 We assume that K(￿B) has an inverted-U
shape ￿increasing with ￿B at low levels, reaching a peak, and then decreasing with ￿B. This
shape captures the idea that a very low value of ￿B does not yield any control, but liquidity
constraints or lack of diversi￿cation make a very high ￿B costly to the shareholder. The
inverted-U shape of K(￿B) guarantees an interior optimum in ￿B.
Taking E and td as given, the board of directors chooses ￿B, ￿ and ￿ to maximize
￿B[(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E) ￿ P￿] ￿ c(￿) + K(￿B) (29)
where P￿ is the equilibrium price of the ￿rm, which the acquirer takes as ￿xed when making
the tender o⁄er to the dispersed shareholders. The ￿rst order conditions with respect to ￿,
￿, and ￿B are:








(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E) ￿ P￿ = ￿K0(￿B) (32)
In equilibrium, P￿ = (1￿td ￿￿)P(￿;￿;E). Hence, the ￿rst order condition for ￿B simpli￿es
to K0(￿B) = 0, which implies that ￿B is independent of td and E in equilibrium. The solution
of the acquirer￿ s problem thus yields functions ￿(td;E), ￿(td;E) and a constant ￿B.
Finally, the dispersed shareholders choose E to maximize their total dividend payout net
of equity investment. We assume that dispersed shareholders anticipate the equilibrium levels
of ￿ and ￿ after the takeover when choosing E. However, the dispersed shareholders do not
23In the appendix, we show that modelling such bene￿ts as kickbacks from the manager to the large share-
holder (a ￿corrupt board￿ ) yields similar results.
30internalize the e⁄ect of their choice of E on ￿ and ￿ because they are small. Hence, E is
chosen to maximize
WM = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E) ￿ E (33)
The ￿rst order condition with respect to E is:




The solution to (34) yields a function E(td;￿;￿). The Nash equilibrium levels of ￿;￿; and E
are given by a triplet (￿￿;￿￿;E￿) such that each player￿ s behavior is optimal given the other￿ s
choice:
￿￿ = ￿(td;E￿), ￿￿ = ￿(td;E￿), E￿ = E(td;￿￿;￿￿).
The equilibrium triplet is a function of td, the only remaining exogenous variable in the model.
E¢ ciency Analysis. Let the equilibrium value of the ￿rm be denoted by
V (td) = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿￿(td))P(￿￿(td);￿￿(td);E￿(td))
Since the manager is held to the participation constraint as above, social surplus is
W = tdP + V (td) ￿ E ￿ K(￿B) ￿ c(￿) (35)
We can now state our general formula for the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation.










Proof. Totally di⁄erentiating V with respect to td gives
V 0(td) = ￿P +
￿














Using the ￿rst order conditions (30) and (34), this expression simpli￿es to:























which can be rewritten as (36). QED.
Equation (36) is the same formula that we obtained in equation (26) with ￿xed ￿B and
no equity issues, except that both ￿ and E are held constant when computing dP
dtd in the ￿rst-
order term in (36).24 Intuitively, E is set at the second-best e¢ cient level that maximizes
total private surplus because shareholders, and not entrenched managers, choose E. When
choosing the amount of equity, the dispersed shareholders internalize the bene￿ts that accrue
to other shareholders (e.g. the block holder) because of the ability to trade shares after the
equity issue. The optimality of the equity decision explains why the ￿rst-order term in (36)
depends on dP=dtd keeping both ￿ and E ￿xed, as there is no externality problem in the choice
of these variables.
Allowing for endogenous determination of ￿B does not a⁄ect the formula in (26) at all
because the acquirer chooses ￿B to maximize his private rather than social surplus (neglecting
the minority shareholders). The free-rider externality problem therefore remains unresolved.
As a result, dividend taxation leads to a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency cost by distorting the choices of
￿B and ￿. Both of these channels are taken into account in the empirical estimate of dP
dtdj￿;E,
leaving the formula for dW
dtd unchanged.
It is instructive to compare the e⁄ects of making ￿B (board shareownership) and ￿ (man-
ager shareownership) endogenous. As discussed in section 5.1, when ￿B = 1, deadweight
burden is ￿rst-order when ￿ is ￿xed but second-order when ￿ is endogenous. Allowing for
endogenous determination of ￿ makes deadweight burden second-order because the costs of
raising ￿ are shared through dilution, and thus ￿ is e⁄ectively chosen to maximize total private
surplus even with multiple shareholders. In contrast, deadweight burden remains ￿rst-order
when ￿B is endogenous because ￿B is not chosen to maximize total private surplus, since the
costs of controlling and monitoring the ￿rm are borne only by the large shareholder. This
24The value of
dP
dtdj￿;E can be estimated empirically using the same method as in the second case above.
In particular, an estimate of
@E￿(td)
@td can be used to remove the E channel from dP=dtd using the ￿rst-order
condition in (34), just as we removed the ￿ channel in (28).
32contrast between the e⁄ects of making ￿ and ￿B endogenous underscores the central role of
the second-best e¢ ciency of private contracts in determining the e¢ ciency cost of taxation.
5.4 Extensions
In the appendix, we analyze two additional extensions of the model to evaluate the robustness
of the formulas derived above. First, we extend the model of Section 5.3 to allow the ￿rm
to raise funds through debt (L) in addition to equity E. Debt pays a ￿xed interest rate r
and also di⁄ers from equity in its tax treatment, in that interest payments are not subject
to the dividend tax. The corporate ￿nance literature has emphasized that debt ￿nance is
more costly than equity because of the risk of an expensive bankruptcy, which explains why
companies use equity despite the tax advantage of debt (see e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976,
Brealey and Myers 2003). We model the cost of carrying debt in reduced-form through a
convex cost function cL(L). The dispersed shareholders choose both E and L in the ￿rst
stage; all other stages are as above. We obtain the same formula for dW
dtd as in Proposition 3,
except that the ￿rst-order term depends on dP
dtdj￿;E;L for reasons analogous to those discussed
above with endogenous equity issues.
Second, we extend the model of Section 5.2 to allow for an internal ￿culture of corruption￿
within the board of directors. Recent studies have argued that the board itself may receive
implicit or explicit private bene￿ts from the manager￿ s pet projects (see e.g., Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). Such transfers add to the bene￿ts of control for the acquirer (K), but create
a further disincentive to monitor the manager. We model such corruption by adding a term
￿￿g(J) to the board of director￿ s welfare in (25). In this case, the formula in (28) carries over
without any changes.25 The e¢ ciency cost formulas are generally robust because introducing
additional choice variables or constraints into the manager￿ s and shareholders￿problems does
not a⁄ect the key envelope conditions, as long as these choices do not have externalities on
other agents.
Following standard practice in the public ￿nance literature, we have ignored share re-
purchases as a means of returning money to shareholders. Unlike the other simplifying
assumptions, the exclusion of repurchases is a substantive limitation of our analysis. Share
25Formula (26) with dP=dtdj￿ cannot be used when ￿ > 0 because the corruption term ￿g(J(￿;￿)) introduces
an externality in the choice of ￿ as well, which has to be taken into account in the marginal deadweight burden
computation.
33repurchases can a⁄ect the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation in di⁄erent ways, depending on
how the repurchase decision is modelled. If repurchases are e⁄ectively negative equity issues,
our formula is unchanged since the analysis above permits negative E. This assumes, how-
ever, that the repurchase decision is made by shareholders rather than the manager. If the
repurchase decision is made by the manager, and capital gains and dividends are taxed at the
same rate, then (36) can still be used, replacing dividend payouts with the sum of dividends
and repurchases. If the tax rates di⁄er, the e¢ ciency cost is more complicated, and will in
general depend on both the repurchase and dividend elasticities. Both payout choices create
externalities on the dispersed shareholders and therefore create ￿rst-order distortions, poten-
tially of opposite sign. In view of the sensitivity of the results to the way in which repurchases
are modelled, we do not attempt to characterize the e¢ ciency cost of dividend taxation in an
environment with repurchases here.
6 Illustrative Calibration
A useful feature of the formula in Proposition 3 is that it depends on a small set of para-
meters that can in principle be estimated empirically. The primitives of the model ￿e.g.
the monitoring and share acquisition cost functions c(￿) and K(￿B) or the pet project payo⁄
g(J) ￿a⁄ect e¢ ciency costs only through the high-level elasticities and equilibrium ownership
structure (e.g. "P;1￿t, ￿, ￿B). Since these high-level inputs are estimated empirically, our
method of computing the e¢ ciency cost of taxation is robust to variations in the structural
parametrization of the model. This is important because estimating the deep structural para-
meters would be di¢ cult, especially since they represent reduced forms of complex contracts
and payo⁄s for shareholders and management.
As an illustration, we calibrate the marginal deadweight cost of raising the dividend tax
from the current rate of 15% relative to the marginal revenue from raising the tax. We assume
that equity and debt issues do not vary with t in this calculation, so that dP
dtdj￿;E;D = dP
dtdj￿. In
this case, the formula in Proposition 3 coincides with the empirically convenient representation
in (28). Note that managerial share ownership (￿) is quite small relative to "P;1￿td in practice:
in the Execucomp sample analyzed in Figure 1, total executive shareownership averages less
than ￿ = 0:03 in all years.26 Therefore, the second term in (28), which is proportional to ￿,
26Although our calculation focuses solely on stock ownership, accounting for other forms of incentive-based
34is likely to be negligible in magnitude. As an approximation we ignore this term and assume
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Although we interpreted ￿B as ￿board shareownership￿in the model, large shareholders could
potentially in￿ uence manager￿ s decisions even if they are not o¢ cially on the board. We
therefore calibrate ￿B using a broader measure by including both board members and all other
large (5%+) blockholders. Using data from the IRRC and Dlugosz et al. (2007), we estimate
that (non employee) board members and large blockholders together owned an average of
￿B = 0:1 of shares between 1998 and 2001 (see data appendix for details).27 Plugging







Generating $1 of additional revenue from the dividend tax starting from a rate of 15% would
generate deadweight loss of 93 cents in the short run. 15 cents of this deadweight burden comes
from the conventional Harberger e⁄ect and 78 cents comes from the ￿rst-order ampli￿cation
of the free-rider distortion in the agency model.
As a di⁄erent method of gauging the magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost, we calculate the cost
of increasing the dividend tax rate back to the pre-2003 level. The 2003 dividend tax reform
cut the tax rate on quali￿ed dividends paid to individuals by about 20 percentage points.
Quali￿ed dividend payments to individuals totalled P = $119 billion in 2005 (US Treasury
Department: Internal Revenue Service, 2007). Using the linear approximation of W(td) in
(37), a 20 percentage point increase in the dividend tax rate would reduce total social welfare
by the equivalent of $19 billion, or 0.2% of GDP. Equation (38) implies that the tax increase
would produce approximately $21 billion of additional government revenue in the short run.
pay is unlikely to raise ￿ signi￿cantly. Existing studies have measured ￿ more broadly by computing the change
in the wealth of a CEO when his ￿rm￿ s value increases by $1. These studies estimate that ￿ is less than 1%
on average for CEOs of publicly traded corporations in the U.S. (see Murphy 1999 for a survey).
27Unfortunately, we could not study the e⁄ect of the 2003 dividend tax reform on the broader measure of ￿B
in Figure 1 because the Dlugosz et al. data on large blockholders is available only through 2001.
35These calculations should be viewed as illustrative because they ignore several potentially
important issues. First, and most importantly, the estimate of "P;1￿td in Chetty and Saez
(2005) is a short-run elasticity: it compares changes in dividend payments in a three-year
window around the 2003 reform. The long-run elasticity could be signi￿cantly smaller if
companies paid out excess cash holdings that they had built up immediately after the tax
cut. In addition, as shown in Figure 1, the ownership structure of the ￿rm appears to have
remained roughly constant over the horizon we studied. In the longer run, ￿ and E would
respond to the tax regime, further a⁄ecting "P;1￿td and introducing a wedge between dP=dtd
and dP=dtdj￿;E. A second limitation of our calibration is that it ignores share repurchases.
In Chetty and Saez (2006), we present suggestive evidence that companies did not substitute
dividends for repurchases, but further analysis is needed on this issue. Third, our analysis
ignores the potential role of dividends as signals, in which case dividend taxation could have
little impact on e¢ ciency despite reducing dividend payments (Bernheim 1991). Finally, as in
any normative analysis, one must consider the distributional implications of dividend taxation
in addition to its e¢ ciency consequences. If the incidence of dividend taxes are borne by
wealthy shareholders, it is possible that taxing dividends does not have a large impact on
social welfare from a utilitarian perspective.
7 Conclusion
The public ￿nance literature on corporate taxation is based primarily on models of pro￿t-
maximizing ￿rms. In contrast, since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the corporate ￿nance
literature has emphasized deviations from pro￿t maximization by managers as a central deter-
minant of ￿rm behavior. This paper has taken a step toward bridging this gap. We analyzed
the e⁄ects of dividend taxation in a standard agency model, and showed that it can explain
many aspects of the empirical evidence that pose problems for existing models.
The agency model yields several new insights into the e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation.
E¢ ciency costs depend critically on the ownership structure of the ￿rm. If the ￿rm is owned by
a single principal who monitors the manager, dividend taxation has a second-order e¢ ciency
cost. Despite overinvestment due to the agency problem, the Harberger formula applies
because the private market still achieves a second-best e¢ cient outcome given the informational
36constraints inherent in the manager-shareholder relationship. However, if the ￿rm is owned
by many shareholders, as are most modern corporations, the private market is unlikely to
achieve a second-best e¢ cient outcome because of free-riding in monitoring. As a result,
Pareto improvements which respect the informational constraints are left unexploited in the
equilibrium contract between shareholders and managers. In this environment, dividend
taxation exacerbates the under-monitoring problem and creates a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency loss.
An illustrative calibration of our formula for deadweight cost using empirical estimates
from the 2003 tax reform points to two general lessons. First, the main potential source of
ine¢ ciency from increasing the dividend tax rate is the misallocation of capital by managers
because of reduced monitoring, and not the classic distortion to the overall level of investment
emphasized in the ￿old view￿model. Second, from a policy perspective, our analysis suggests
that dividend taxation should be used relatively little given its ine¢ ciency if the government
has other tools (e.g. progressive income taxation integrated with corporate taxation) that
have similar distributional e⁄ects but do not create ￿rst-order distortions. In fact, a dividend
subsidy may be desirable to subsidize monitoring and correct the free-rider problem.
Our analysis calls for further empirical work related to agency issues in corporate taxation.
In our model, a dividend tax cut raises e¢ ciency by improving the allocation of capital: ￿rms
with excess cash holdings invest less following a tax cut, while cash-constrained ￿rms invest
more. Testing whether tax reforms generate such heterogeneous investment responses across
￿rms would shed light on the empirical importance of this allocation e¢ ciency mechanism.
Our analysis can also be re￿ned in several respects in future theoretical work. Although
our formula for deadweight burden generalizes the existing ￿old view￿and ￿new view￿results,
it does not nest the signalling model. The signalling model can explain why companies pay
dividends despite the tax advantage of repurchases (Bernheim 1991), unlike our simple agency
model. A model that combines signalling and agency e⁄ects could therefore yield a more
precise understanding of the e¢ ciency costs of dividend taxation in the presence of share
repurchases.28 More generally, further research on the interactions between agency theory
and taxation could yield insights into the welfare consequences of other important policy issues
such as the corporate tax, the capital gains tax, and tax treatment of interest payments.
28Such an analysis would be particularly interesting in view of Bernheim￿ s (1991) striking result that the
e¢ ciency cost of taxation is zero even though dividends fall with the tax rate in the signalling model.
37Appendix A: Extensions of E¢ ciency Analysis
Corrupt Board.
Consider the model in section 5.2 with ￿xed ￿B for simplicity; as above, allowing for
endogenous determination of ￿B does not a⁄ect the results. To allow for imperfect monitoring
of the managers by the board because of internal corruption, we introduce an additional term
￿ ￿g(J) into the board￿ s welfare. This changes the board￿ s objective when setting ￿ and ￿ to
WB = ￿B(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿) ￿ c(￿) + ￿g(J(￿;￿))
The manager￿ s problem and dispersed shareholders￿welfare are the same as in section 5.2
conditional on ￿ and ￿. Total surplus is tdP +WB +WM. As is now familiar, we exploit the
envelope conditions for ￿; and ￿ in WB to obtain:
dW
dtd
= P + td
dP
dtd
￿ ￿BP ￿ (1 ￿ ￿B)P + (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)
dP
dtd
￿ (1 ￿ ￿B)P
d￿
dtd
which again coincides with the formula for deadweight burden in (28). One way to understand
this result is by viewing the ￿g(J(￿;￿)) term as a modi￿cation of the cost function c(￿). Since
c does not enter our formula for deadweight burden, allowing for internal corruption via ￿ > 0
does not a⁄ect the results.
Debt Finance.
Suppose the ￿rm can raise funds from both the stock market via new equity issues (E)
and the bond market by issuing debt (L ￿ 0), which pays a ￿xed return r that is deducted
from pro￿ts. Issuing debt has a cost cL(L), e.g. re￿ ecting the risk of bankruptcy, which is
deducted from the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts. The ￿rm￿ s total cash available for dividends and
investment is X +E +L but the ￿rm has to repay (1+r)L at the end of period 1 (i.e., has to
repay L from a period 0 perspective). The ￿rm￿ s and shareholder￿ s choices can be broken into
two stages as in section 5.3. First, there is a game where dispersed shareholders issue debt
and equity (L;E) and the board of directors forms through costly acquisitions of a large block
of shares (￿B) and chooses a contract ￿;￿ with the manager. Second, the manager chooses D
and I given the contract he faces.








In this setting, the ￿rm￿ s total expected dividend payout is
P(￿;￿;E;L) = D(￿;￿;E;L) + ￿f(I(￿;￿;E;L))=(1 + r) ￿ S(￿;￿;E;L) ￿ L ￿ cL(L)
As in the text, conditional on E, L, and td the board of directors chooses ￿, ￿, and ￿B to
maximize
WB = ￿B[(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E;L) ￿ V (td)] ￿ c(￿) ￿ K(￿B)
The ￿rst order condition for ￿B is again K0(￿B) = 0 which shows that ￿B is independent from
other variables.
Finally, the dispersed shareholders choose E and L to maximize their total payout net of
equity investment conditional on ￿;￿, and td:
WM = (1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E;L) ￿ E
The maximization programs lead to a Nash equilibrium quartuple (￿￿;￿￿;E￿;L￿) which
depends only on td. As above, we denote the net value of the ￿rm in equilibrium by V (td) =
(1 ￿ td ￿ ￿)P(￿;￿;E;L).
Social surplus is de￿ned as
W = tdP + WB + WM = tdP(td) + V (td) ￿ E￿(td) ￿ c(￿￿(td)) ￿ K(￿B)
as in the text. Because L maximizes P(￿;￿;E;L), @P=@L = 0. Following the same steps




Appendix B: Data for Figure 1 and Table 2
Data Sources.
Executive Share Ownership. Data on top executive ownership comes from the Compustat
Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database. For each ￿rm/year, executive share owner-
ship is calculated as the total number of shares excluding options held by executives covered
39by ExecuComp divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The ￿rm-level data is ag-
gregated by taking a weighted mean across all ￿rms, with (￿xed) weights equal to the average
market capitalization (reported in ExecuComp) between 1996 and 2005.
Board of Director Share Ownership. Data on director ownership comes from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Director database, available through Wharton Re-
search Data Services. For each ￿rm/year, director share ownership is calculated as the total
number of shares held by non-employee directors (as identi￿ed by the variable DIRTYPE)
divided by the total number of shares outstanding from ExecuComp. To reduce measurement
error, a small number of observations are omitted if the implied percentage of director owner-
ship exceeds 100%. As with executive ownership, the annual series is computed as a weighted
mean with weights equal to the average market capitalization between 1996 and 2005.
Dividend Payments. Data on dividend payments come from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). The annual series is calculated as the sum of all taxable regular (non
special) dividends paid by U.S. corporations (excluding utilities and ￿nancials) listed on the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges. See Chetty and Saez (2005) for more details.
Calibration of ￿B in Section 6.
The value for ￿B used in the calibration is based on the sum of the average fraction of
shares held by non-employee directors and the average fraction held by other large independent
blockholders (de￿ned as holdings that exceed 5% of the total shares outstanding). The data
on large blockholders comes from the dataset constructed by Dlugosz et al. (2007), available
through WRDS. The data on board ownership is from the raw IRRC dataset described above.
The average level of non-employee director ownership in the IRRC between 1998 and
2001 is 2.5%. The average level of outside blockholder ownership (as de￿ned by the variable
SUMOUT) between 1998 and 2001 (the last year of data) for the same set of ￿rms in the
Dlugosz et al. dataset is 7.5%. In both calculations, the average is calculated as the mean
weighted by each ￿rm￿ s average market capitalization over the sample period. Summing these
two estimates, we obtain ￿B = 10%.
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43Initial Cash X Low: f'(X)>(1+r)/(1-td) Medium: (1+r)/(1-td)>=f'(X)>=1+r High: 1+r>f'(X) High: 1+r>f'(X) and g'(X-I
S)>=ω (1+r) Very High: 1+r>f'(X) and g'(X-I
S)<ω (1+r)
Dividends D D=0 D=0 D>0, f'(X-D)=1+r D=0 D>0, g'(X-I
S-D)=ω(1+r)
Equity Issues E E>0, f'(X+E)=(1+r)/(1-td) E=0 E=0 E=0 E=0
Productive Investment I I>X, f'(I)=(1+r)/(1-td) I=X, f'(I)=f'(X) I<X, f'(I)=1+r g'(X-I)=ωf'(I), f'(I)>1+r f'(I)=1+r, g'(J)=ω(1+r)
Effects of reducing No effect on D Intensive margin: No effect on D, E, I No effect on D, E, I Intensive margin: No effect on D and E, D increases, J decreases
dividend tax td I increases, E increases Extensive margin: Some firms shift to I increases, J decreases No effect on I and E
low cash regime, start issuing E Extensive margin: Some firms shift to
and increase I very high cash regime, start paying dividends
Heterogeneity of D None None None Extensive margin: higher likelihood and larger D Larger increase in D if exec. or board share
response to tax cut initiations if exec. or board share high high (if third derivatives of g, c small)
by ownership structure
Efficiency cost of td Harberger Harberger (along extensive margin) None Harberger if βB=1 Harberger if βB=1
Harberger + first order effect if βB<1 Harberger + first order effect if βB<1
NOTE-- This table summarizes the firm's choice of dividends (D), equity issues (E), and investment (I) in the neoclassical and agency models.  Behavior depends on the level of initial cash 
holding X, which varies across the columns. I
S denotes the efficient investment level such that f'(I
S)=1+r.  In the agency model, shareholders issue equity if cash holdings are sufficiently low.  
In this case, the efficiency costs of td remain the same as those listed in the last row of the table.
Table 1
Agency Model
Summary of Key Predictions: Neoclassical vs. Agency Models
New View Old View
Neoclassical Model(1) (2) (3)
Log Executive Log Director Log Dividend 
Ownership Share Ownership Share Payments
Post-2003 Indicator 0.048 -0.048 0.148
(0.063) (0.075) (0.043)
Year -0.083 -0.014 -0.014
(0.010) (0.012) (0.043)
Constant 166.061 29.367 40.246
(20.129) (24.173) (13.897)
Number of Obs. 9 9 9
Regression Estimates: Effect of 2003 Tax Cut
TABLE 2
on Ownership Structure and Dividend Payments
NOTE--Each column reports estimates of an OLS regression; standard errors in 
parentheses.  Post-2003 dummy is an indicator for year>=2003. To construct executive 
shareownership measure, we first compute the total fraction of shares held by executives 
of each firm listed in Execucomp, and then calculate an annual mean, weighting each firm 
by its average market capitalization over the sample period.   Board ownership share is 
constructed analogously using data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center.  
Dividend payments are defined as total dividend payments by all firms listed in CRSP, as 
in Chetty and Saez (2006).  Sample for all regressions includes the years from 1996-2005.  
See data appendix for additional details on sample and variable definitions.Figure 1






















































































































































1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Top Executive Ownership Board of Director Ownership
Dividend Payments
Top Executive Ownership Board of Director Ownership
Dividend Payments
NOTE–This figure plots the annual evolution of three variables around the 2003
dividend tax cut, demarcated by the vertical line. The first series is log average
executive shareownership. To construct this measure, we first compute the total
fraction of shares held by executives of each firm listed in Execucomp, and then
calculate an annual mean, weighting each firm by its average market capitalization over
the sample period. Average board of director shareownership is constructed
analogously using data for all firms listed in the Investor Responsibility Research
Center database. Dividend payments are defined as total regular dividend payments
by all firms listed in CRSP, as in Chetty and Saez (2006). The scale for dividend
payments (right axis) is chosen so that the range of the right and left axis is the same
(0.8 log points) for comparability of trends. See data appendix for additional details on
sample and variable definitions.Figure 2
Manager’s Decision Rules as a Function of Weight on Profits 










Period 0 Dividends (D)
NOTE–This figure plots the manager’s optimal choice of dividends, profitable
investment, and pet project investment as a function of his weight on profits, ￿. The
simulation assumes a total cash holding of X ￿ 2, profitable investment production
function f￿I￿ ￿ 2I ￿ I2
2 , pet production function g￿J￿ ￿ 1
10 ￿2J ￿ J2
2 ￿, and interest
rate r ￿ 0.Figure 3a
Effect of Tax Cut on Dividends by Managerial Shareownership































































Effect of Tax Cut on Dividends by Board Shareownership
NOTE–These figures show how the effect of a dividend tax cut on dividends varies
across firms with different ownership structures. In Figure 3a, the lower curve plots
dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the manager (￿) when the tax rate is
40%. The upper curve plots the same when the tax rate is 20%. Figure 3b plots
dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the board of directors in the two tax
regimes. Simulations are based on the same parametric assumptions as in Figure 2
along with c￿￿￿ ￿ 10￿2.